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CONTEMPLATING MUSIC
IntroduzioneLa filosofia della musica è uno dei principali campi cui Jerrold Levin-son ha dedicato la sua riflessione e anche in CA, così come in Music,
Art and Metaphysics (MAM) e The Pleasures of Aesthetics (PA), all’artedei suoni è dedicata una specifica sezione che valorizza, accanto allacostituzione formale, i possibili contenuti della musica, emergenti inuna contemplazione che è al contempo partecipazione attiva, di tiposia emotivo sia riflessivo, da parte dell’ascoltatore. I saggi ‘musicali’ diCA, le cui tesi Levinson ha più recentemente sviluppato in varie dire-zioni1, 1. approfondiscono la teoria dell’espressività musicale già pre-sentata in MAM e PA (la cosiddetta ‘teoria della persona’, TP), 2. la ar-ticolano in relazione ad aspetti particolari dell’esperienza musicale(per es. la performance), e 3. ne esaminano il contributo per la com-prensione della dimensione narrativa e drammatica della musicanonché, in generale 4., come elemento centrale del suo valore artisti-co. Qui mi concentrerò soprattutto sul punto 1., toccando poi più bre-vemente i punti 2., 3. e 4. Non muoverò particolari critiche alle tesiqui argomentate da Levinson (eccettuata la proposta diun’integrazione alla sua tesi sul valore intrinseco-esperienziale dellamusica), perché a differenza di alcune posizioni di altri filosofi anali-tici della musica, e anche di alcuni orientamenti dello stesso Levinsonrispetto all’ontologia della musica (cui CA non offre particolari con-tributi), le condivido in larghissima misura. Piuttosto, presenteròquelli che mi sembrano i punti salienti della sezione musicale di CA,provando, in un caso, a difendere le proposte levinsoniane da alcuneobiezioni.
1 Cfr. per es. The Aesthetic Appreciation of Music, «British Journal of Aesthetics» 49 (2009);
Philosophy and Music, «Topoi», 28 (2009); Musical Beauty, «Teorema», 31 (2012); Jazz Vocal
Interpretation: A Philosophical Analysis, «Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism» 71 (2013);
Popular Song as Moral Microcosm: Life Lessons from Jazz Standards, «Philosophy», Supple-ment 71 (2013); Die expressive Spezifität des Jazz, «Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeineKunstwissenschaft», 59/1 (2014) (Ästhetik des Jazz, Hg. von A. Bertinetto, G. Bertram, D.M.Feige).
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1. La teoria della personaLevinson spiega l’espressività musicale con il seguente argomento.Un brano o un passaggio musicale è espressivo di un’emozione sol-tanto qualora sia ascoltato, da un ascoltatore esperto, come espres-sione di essa. Ma l’atto di esprimere richiede un agente che (si) e-sprime. Quindi, chi ascolta la musica come espressiva è impegnato adascoltare (o almeno a immaginare) un agente nella musica – la perso-
na musicale: un ente fittizio «caratterizzato soltanto dall’emozioneche la ascoltiamo esprimere e dal gesto musicale mediante cui la e-sprime» (CA, p. 93). La tesi è che, se ascoltiamo la musica come e-spressiva, è perché attribuiamo direttamente e immediatamente(cioè in modo non inferenziale e per lo più inconsapevole2)l’emozione o lo stato affettivo espressi a un agente, e questo anchequando, pur riconoscendo un carattere espressivo, non siamo in gra-do di individuare precisamente l’emozione espressa. Questo agentenon è (per forza) – come volevano le teorie romantiche – il composi-tore o l’interprete, ma un soggetto immaginario – e per questo indefi-nito: la persona musicale, che si costituisce attraverso la gestualitàmusicale che l’ascoltatore percepisce come espressiva.La questione principale concerne la difendibilità di TP. Tra leobiezioni discusse, e respinte, in CA (pp. 97-107) quella più pericolo-sa è se per spiegare l’espressività sia necessario supporre un soggettofittizio che provi le emozioni. Infatti, la validità di TP dipende da quel-la della premessa che ‘l’atto di esprimere richiede un agente che e-sprime’, una tesi che molti rifiutano. In particolare secondo JosephMargolis non è ovvio che ogni espressività debba essere una forma diespressione3. Spiegando l’espressività esclusivamente come forma diespressione, non si riuscirebbe a chiarire alcuni fenomeni espressiviin cui è evidente l’assenza di un soggetto che si esprime e nel cui casoil riconoscimento del carattere espressivo dipende dai criteri esterio-
2 La non-inferenzialità dell’attribuzione dell’emozione espressa alla persona musicale è unadelle differenze della teoria di Levinson rispetto alle teorie della persona musicale di Robin-son e Vermazen. Cfr. J. Robinson, Deeper than Reason, Emotion and its Role in Literature, Mu-
sic and Art, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005; B. Vermazen, Expression as Expression, «PacificPhilosophical Quarterly», 67 (1986), pp. 196-224.3 J. Margolis, On Aesthetics: An Unforgiving Introduction, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth, 2009, p.88.
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ri di pratiche culturali e sociali. Insomma, le attribuzioni di predicatiespressivi non implicherebbero stati psicologici né reali né fittizi. Ilricorso a un soggetto fittizio sarebbe errato, perché l’espressività di-pende semplicemente da pratiche condivise, che hanno le loro regole(le loro ‘grammatiche’ per dirla con Wittgenstein) e funzionano sulpiano della mediazione storico-culturale. L’espressività riconoscibilepercettivamente dipenderebbe da topoi e convenzioni caratterizzantiun genere, una tradizione, una cultura. Il punto di forza dell’obiezioneè il tentativo di stabilizzare l’espressività, oggettivandola come risul-tato di mediazioni culturali. Ciò consente di capire come e perché unascoltatore sia in grado di afferrare il carattere espressivo di un bra-no di un genere di cui è esperto, mentre non riesca a farlo se, non es-sendo avvezzo a quel genere di musica, non ne domina la grammati-ca. L’argomento della dimensione culturale e grammaticaledell’espressività ha buon gioco, per es., contro la ‘teoria della somi-glianza’ di Kivy e Davies4, che, come Margolis, presuppongono la di-stinzione tra esprimere un’emozione E ed essere espressivo di E, cioè
avere soltanto l’apparenza esteriore dell’espressione di E. Cionondime-no, se usato come obiezione contro TP, tale argomento è inefficace.L’espressione emozionale, tanto ordinaria quanto artistica, ricorrecertamente a figure espressive riconosciute, soggette a trasformazio-ne storica e regolate da una grammatica culturale. Tuttavia, dire chel’espressione delle emozioni è esteriorizzata nei comportamenti rego-lati da grammatiche culturali non impedisce di sostenere – in parzialeaccordo con Wittgenstein – «che tali comportamenti pubblicamenteosservabili siano parzialmente ‘costitutivi’ delle emozioni, essendo alcontempo ‘indicatori’ delle componenti non-osservabili, interne, e-sperienziali di quelle emozioni»5. Dunque, il riconoscere la dimensio-ne esteriore e grammaticale dell’espressione musicale non escludeche attraverso le figure espressive musicali si possa riconoscerel’espressione di un agente immaginario e che questo riconoscimentosia rilevante per il riconoscimento dell’espressività di un brano o diun passaggio. Anzi – e qui va cercato il contributo teorico specifico di
4 P. Kivy, The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression, Princeton, N.J., Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1981; S. Davies, Themes in Philosophy of Music, Oxford, Oxford University Press,2003.5 J. Levinson, comunicazione privata.
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Levinson – l’attribuzione dell’espressione a una persona (fittizia) ènecessaria per riconoscere la musica come espressiva. Una cosa è ri-conoscere attraverso l’ascolto una serie di figure espressive costruiteculturalmente, individuando la grammatica dell’espressività di unbrano. Altra cosa è sentire che il brano esprime emozioni e sentimen-ti. Così come si può distinguere tra il riconoscimento della gestualitàespressiva convenzionale o tipica utilizzata da una persona e la cre-denza che tale gestualità sia non soltanto l’esercizio di una grammati-ca espressiva, ma rifletta davvero le emozioni di un soggetto, cosìnell’esperienza musicale il riconoscimento di una grammatica espres-siva non è automaticamente il riconoscimento dell’espressionedell’emozione, e questo anche se la grammatica espressiva può esserelo strumento per tale espressione.Si potrebbe ancora respingere TP, argomentando, come faChristian Grüny6, che il riconoscimento di un evento musicale comegesto espressivo non implica l’attribuzione del gesto a un portatore, equindi a una persona, anche quando richieda una reazione emotivada parte dell’ascoltatore. In che senso però i gesti possono esseresvincolati da un soggetto che gesticola? Per riconoscere un mutamen-to o un movimento come un gesto dobbiamo attribuirlo a qualcuno,anche quando pur riconoscendo l’espressività del gesto non siamo ingrado di categorizzare esattamente l’emozione espressa. Nella realtàse vedo un sorriso, non soltanto percepisco la gioia o la serenità nelcomportamento, ma vedo il volto che sorride, percepisco l’agente.Anzi, percepisco l’agente insieme alla sua espressione, percepiscol’espressione come risultato dell’azione di un agente. Quindi, se per-cepisco un mutamento o un movimento sonoro come un gesto o comeuna serie di gesti, che esprimono emozioni o affetti cui sono a miavolta portato a rispondere emotivamente o affettivamente, è plausibi-le pensare che stia immaginando un agente che gesticola e che produ-ce il gesto. Se ascolto un brano come espressivo, sento l’attodell’espressione e questo implica l’ipotesi di una persona fittizia. Lapersona è richiesta per stabilire la connessione basilare conl’esperienza emozionale7. Se l’ascoltatore percepisce un gesto, perce-
6 C. Grüny, Die Kunst des Übergangs, Weilerswist, Velbrück, 2014.7 Paolo Spinicci mi ha invitato a riflettere sulla seguente difficoltà di TP: l’espressività musi-cale può a volte essere irriducibile a una persona umana. La musica sembra a volte essereper es. espressione di un destino cosmico o di dimensioni emozionali sovrumane, imperso-
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pisce il gesto di qualcuno: altrimenti percepisce un mutamento o unmovimento, ma non un gesto che ne esprime l’articolazione affettivao emozionale. Percepire un mutamento non comporta necessaria-mente la percezione del mutamento come un gesto espressivo. Anchese a volte è difficile individuare il gesto espressivo e comprendere inquali fatti sonori esso si produca, ciò significa soltanto che gli ascolta-tori devono apprendere a riconoscere il gesto espressivo musicale,così come devono imparare a cogliere l’espressività di un dipinto, e inmodo analogo a come devono apprendere a interpretare la gestualitàdegli individui reali.
2. La persona nella performanceLa questione è di primaria importanza anche per valutare comel’espressività del gesto reale del musicista mentre suona uno stru-mento o canta possa influire sulla comprensione dell’espressività del-la musica. In CA, infatti, senza tornare su specifiche questioni di onto-logia dell’opera d’arte musicale, Levinson, sollecitato dal libro di R.Casati e J. Dokic La Philosophie du son8, difende la centralità della rea-le esperienza sonora (percettiva e/o immaginativa) della musica perla comprensione dell’espressività9. La tesi è che l’espressività musica-le – e dunque la persona musicale – sia spesso funzione della gestuali-tà fisica reale dei musicisti, che il pubblico può osservare a un concer-to o immaginare proprio attraverso l’articolazione sonora. Infatti,l’ascolto di un gesto musicale comporta l’utilizzo della capacità diformarsi un’immagine spaziale delle possibili sorgenti dei suoni a-nali. Credo che Levinson potrebbe difendersi in due modi. 1. Le emozioni espresse dalla mu-sica possono avere un carattere cosmico, destinale; possono cioè riguardare l’impotenza u-mana di fronte al caso, al destino, ecc. La musica può essere espressione di un’angoscia esi-stenziale generale, non attribuibile a questo o quell’altro individuo. Ciononostante ciò nonsignifica che queste non siano emozioni di una persona: sono le emozioni di una persona chehanno per oggetto una dimensione emozionale (per es. di angoscia) sovra- o impersonale. 2.Le emozioni possono essere direttamente attribuite a un’entità disumana, impersonale. Peres. si potrebbe pensare di ascoltare l’espressione emozionale del destino. Ma anche in questocaso, sempre che si sia in grado di cogliere una dimensione espressiva, è difficile evitare dipersonalizzare l’expresser disumano. Come nella musica possiamo riconoscere l’espressivitàdi un soggetto collettivo non individuale, così possiamo cogliervi l’espressività di un soggettosovrumano o inumano.8 R. Casati e J. Dokic, La philosophie du son, Nîmes, Editions Jacqueline Chambon, 1994.9 È così respinta l’ipotesi teorica, pur affascinante, della musica visiva. Per motivi di spaziotrascuro qui questo tema, cui ho prestato attenzione in A. Bertinetto, Il pensiero dei suoni, Mi-lano, Bruno Mondadori, 2012, pp. 21-22.
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scoltati. Cogliere il gesto espressivo comporta l’apprendimento deigesti comportamentali e performativi alla base del gesto musicale(cfr. CA pp. 77, 80). La percezione e la comprensione del carattere e-spressivo di un passaggio musicale dipende quindi anche dal caratte-re dell’azione alla base della produzione del suono, che sia essa diret-tamente esperita o immaginata. Se descriviamo come un ‘accarezzarele corde’ l’azione che fa sì che un violino generi una certa sequenza dinote, attribuiremo al passaggio musicale una certa dolcezza o malin-conia espressiva; se invece concettualizziamo un’azione al pianofortecome un ‘martellare sui tasti’, probabilmente individueremo inun’emozione più esuberante il carattere emotivo di quel passaggio(cfr. CA, pp. 82-83). Elaborando le considerazioni di Levinson, si puòsostenere che l’ascoltatore che percepisce un brano musicale comesuonato in modo espressivo può inferirne immaginativamente i mo-vimenti fisicamente richiesti per eseguire la musica ascoltata. A suavolta, l’immaginazione visivo-spaziale può poi influire retrospettiva-mente sull’interpretazione del carattere espressivo del brano10.
3. Narratività e drammaticità musicaleTP, come spiegazione dell’espressività musicale, è alla base dell’ideache alcuni generi musicali abbiano la possibilità di costruire, con lerisorse espressive della musica, articolazioni narrative. Diversamenteda quanto sostenuto dalle estetiche formaliste, almeno in certi casil’esperienza musicale parrebbe simile, piuttosto che a quella delle artivisive, a quella della letteratura o del cinema11. Come queste arti, lamusica si sviluppa nel tempo e ciò parrebbe suggerire la possibilità diattribuirle, oltre che la dimensione espressiva, un carattere narrativo.Levinson difende questa tesi argomentando quanto segue. Unanarrazione è caratterizzata dalla rappresentazione di almeno due e-venti che si succedono nel tempo (tra cui è possibile sussista un le-game causale). Per poter essere narrativa la musica strumentale do-vrebbe poter non solo 1) rappresentare, ma 2) rappresentare eventio stati di cose e 3) la loro connessione temporale e/o causale. Per
10 Ho dedicato qualche riflessione a questo argomento in A. Bertinetto, Vedere la musica, «E-stetica. Studi e ricerche», 1 (2011), pp. 83-123.11 Anzi, la musica è anche un elemento del cinema e Levinson analizza in proposito con la so-lita precisione e copia di riferimenti diversi possibili contributi della musica alla narrazione eall’espressione cinematografica (cfr. CA, pp. 143-183).
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quanto concerne le prime due condizioni, basta che la musica, per po-ter essere narrativa, suggerisca gesti e azioni grazie al suo carattereespressivo. Per quanto riguarda la terza condizione, occorre che unpassaggio musicale a risulti comprensibile e giustificato in quantosuccessivo a un passaggio musicale b. Spiegare a significa compren-dere il motivo del suo succedere a b. Levinson sostiene che in propo-sito si può distinguere tra narratività interna ed esterna. La musica è
esternamente narrativa (è l’oggetto della narrazione del compositoreo del performer), se la ‘storia’ è una sequenza di eventi musicali. È in-
ternamente narrativa (è il soggetto che narra una storia), se la storia èciò cui si riferiscono gli eventi musicali. In questo secondo caso lamusica ha il carattere di una serie di enunciati che raccontano unastoria e deve possedere elementi che svolgano la funzione di elementitipici di un racconto come frasi riflessive del tipo ‘tanto tempo fa,c’era una volta’, ecc. (CA, pp. 133 s.). Diversamente da musica caratte-rizzata da una temporalità non lineare, verticale, discontinua, impres-sionistica e legata al momento, alcuni generi musicali sembrerebberopossedere questi elementi.Inoltre, qualora si percepisca la musica come una sorta dimondo in cui gli eventi accadono indipendentemente da un compo-sitore-narratore, la si interpreterà come drammatica, piuttosto checome narrativa12. A differenza della narrativa, il dramma è una pre-sentazione diretta degli eventi: le azioni non sono raccontate, maeseguite dagli attori sul palco o sullo schermo. Come sembra acca-dere nelle sonate di Beethoven, che offrono un susseguirsi di effettidrammatici costruiti sull’insanabile contrasto tra temi diversi, anchela musica può essere in tal senso intesa come un dramma di eventiche si svolgono qui e ora, davanti all’ascoltatore. Infatti, il drammacomporta l’esistenza di attori che agiscono: e talora sembreràall’ascoltatore che anche in musica le personae musicali (magarirappresentate dai diversi strumenti musicali o da temi particolar-mente caratterizzanti) non soltanto esprimano le loro emozioni, maagiscano e interagiscano (lottando, correndo, urlando, dialogando,saltando, danzando, riposando, ecc.). Credo che Levinson offra qui la
12 Correttamente Levinson chiarisce che quella tra narratività e drammaticità non èun’alternativa rigida: piuttosto, come esistono molti modelli letterari, così i brani musicalipossono avere caratteri prevalentemente narrativi, epici, drammatici o lirici a seconda delloro contenuto, più che del genere (sinfonia, opera, ballata ecc.).
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risposta corretta alle obiezioni formaliste circa la capacità della mu-sica strumentale di narrare o inscenare una storia attraversol’articolazione formale dei suoni. Se l’espressività musicale è ricon-ducibile all’individuazione immaginativa di personae fittizie comesoggetti delle emozioni che percepiamo nella musica, i contenuti de-terminati delle emozioni (che la musica difficilmente può veicolare)sono superflui per legittimare, almeno in certi generi, il riconosci-mento di una vicenda narrata o rappresentata attraverso la musi-ca13.
4. Il valore della musicaTP è infine uno degli elementi con cui Levinson offre la sua soluzionealla questione del valore della musica. Anche in questo caso,l’approccio è pluralistico e antiriduzionistico. Molti sono i tipi di valo-re che l’esperienza musicale può possedere. Essi hanno a che fare conle possibili funzioni della musica per l’individuo e la comunità, con lesue specifiche qualità estetiche e artistiche (di alcune delle quali sol-tanto si può fare esperienza diretta14), con i suoi effetti morali e for-mativi, con la sua capacità di incarnare, implicare o articolare unaforma o un’attività di pensiero15. Il suo valore primario (ma non e-sclusivo) è comunque quello intrinseco-esperienziale, cioè quello rela-tivo all’esperienza dell’ascolto.La tesi è che lo svolgimento temporale della musica, anche (manon solo) per la sua generazione di aspettative deluse o soddisfatte, ele sua qualità espressive offrano un godimento qualitativamente mi-gliore della semplice impressione sonora. Perciò «buona partedell’interesse che la musica suscita va cercato in ciò che essa ci co-munica a proposito dei gesti, delle azioni e dei sentimenti umani»(CA, 19916). Inoltre, specifica Levinson, il fattore determinantedell’intrinseco valore musicale è la fusione di forme che si evolvononel tempo e dei contenuti (attitudini, qualità, emozioni, azioni, eventi)
13 Cfr. P. Rinderle, Die Expressivität von Musik, Paderborn, Mentis, 2010.14 In tal caso la presenza di certe qualità della musica, in particolare quelle espressive, puòessere comunicata dai brividi provati dall’ascoltatore, che sono segnali corporei che indicanoche si è percepito qualcosa di significativo e/o pregevole nella musica (cfr. CA, pp. 233-236).15 Per quest’ultimo aspetto cfr. CA, pp. 209-219.16 Cito dalla trad. it. di F. Focosi, Il valore della musica, in J. Levinson, Arte, critica e storia.
Saggi di estetica analitica, a cura di F. Desideri e F. Focosi, Palermo, Estetica, 2001, p. 209.
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comunicati, ovvero «cosa la musica comunica in relazione a comeprocede» (CA, 200; trad. it., p. 209). Come questo avvenga concreta-mente nei diversi generi può essere spiegato grazie a due modelli (ilsecondo dei quali ricomprende il primo). In base al primo modello, ilfulcro dell’esperienza musicale è la progressione musicale che è in-sieme configurazione di forme ed espressione di contenuti. In base alsecondo (comprensibile in base a TP), lo stesso contenuto espressivoè dotato di forma. L’espressione ha cioè una forma la quale comunicaun contenuto drammatico.Si potrebbe obiettare che quanto sostenuto da Levinson inproposito valga soprattutto per quei generi e quelle forme musicalicostituite da una struttura lineare, caratterizzanti la musica occiden-tale a partire dal ‘700 e che non funzioni pienamente nel caso di mu-siche che valorizzano la dimensione non-lineare e invariante del suo-no (come, ad es., in certa musica improvvisata e/o sperimentale). Intali casi, si potrebbe dire riprendendo la distinzione levinsoniana, è ilmodo in cui la musica suona, piuttosto che il modo in cui essa proce-de, a imporsi all’attenzione dell’ascoltatore. Tuttavia, credo che il pri-vilegio attribuito da Levinson (almeno a questo proposito) alla di-mensione lineare della musica dipenda dal fatto che, anche nella suariflessione sul valore della musica, egli insiste (a ragione) sui pregidell’espressività (che può costituire di per sé un importante meritoartistico) e così, con decisione e profonda intelligenza argomentativa,dischiude per la filosofia analitica della musica un orizzonte assai fe-condo, alternativo a quello formalista sinora dominante.MICHELE DI MONTE(Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Antica di Palazzo Barberini)
CONTEMPLATING ART TRANSHISTORICALLYAmong the very important topics poignantly dealt with by Jerrold Le-vinson in his book, the problem I wish to discuss concerns the rela-tionship between the epistemic conditions of the concept, or con-cepts, of art and their ‘irreducible historicality’, as claimed in Con-
templating Art. Briefly, my idea is that, on the one hand, Levinson’shistorical-intentional theory rests on a postulate – not self-evidentenough – implying the kind of ‘robust historicism’ which Levinson
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tries to evade. On the other hand, however, just the constraints en-suing from that postulate entail a theory with a purely formal, notsubstantive, structure, which risks to make the theory itself paradoxi-cally less irreducibly historical than we should expect17.
1. To what extent can a concept be historical?When we say that a concept is ‘historical’, or ‘has a history’, we usual-ly can mean, at least, two different things. We can say, in a weaksense, that 1) the concept is not documented in use before a certaindate, for instance that of ‘tuberculosis’ before 19th century, although itis however necessary for the retrospective identification of all cor-responding instances, even if they had appeared at the time ofRamses II. However, we can also mean, in a stronger sense, that 2) aconcept evolves or undergoes a modification through its history. Inthe latter case, clearly, we have to put in question the identity condi-tions of the very concept. If we say that a concept C has historicallychanged, so that in the 20th century is not the same as it was, say, inthe 15th century, we have also to make sure that the purported mod-ifications actually pertain to the same concept, otherwise we cannotexclude the possibility that the difference refers to two different con-cepts, possibly sharing just the same name, as in normal cases of ho-monymy. In fact, the history of a name – whose identity is fixed bymorphology – is not the history of a concept. If so, the conceptual his-torical difference, no matter of its nature, cannot be neither absolutenor too radical, and anyway it must be compatible with a deeper con-dition of historical stability and identity, without which it would beimpossible to detect and commensurate the diachronic differences of
that concept. Therefore, dealing with the historicity of concepts (oranything else), we should specify what changes and what remains thesame. Nevertheless, on this point the position of Levinson seems notalways univocal.
17 I will cite the works of J. Levinson as following: DA: Defining Art Historically, in Id. Music,
Art, and Metaphysics, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1990; RA: Refining Art Historically,«Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism» 47 (1993), pp. 21-33; EA: Extending Art Historically,«Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism» 51 (3), 1993, pp. 411-423. Simple page numbersrefer to Contemplating Art. Essays in Aesthetics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.
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On the one hand, it seems that «our present concept of art» (p.15) is a modern phenomenon, emerged only during the 20th centuryor, more exactly, «around 1920» (DA, p. 24), though it is not so clearif that also entails that it would have been impossible to entertainsuch a concept before then. On the other hand, our concept is also auniversal one, which we need to identify and define not only contem-porary works of art, but also the works of past ages, both those whichhad, for contingent reasons, different concepts and those which hadno art concept at all, as far as we can know.This situation depends not only on an epistemic necessity, asLevinson has rightly acknowledged, by which it would be «an illu-sion» to think we can leave «our own conceptual equipment at home,thus arriving neutrally and virtuously at what is art» for ages and cul-tures other than ours, «in their own terms» (EA, p. 154). In fact, thereis also another, more strictly conceptual need, independent fromwhat we can know about artistic conceptions of the past thanks tophilological means. To be judged as art an object must satisfy, in
whatever age it was produced, the conditions of the present conceptof art (that is Levinson’s intentional-retrospective definition), even ifat the time of production (or later) it may have been conceptualizedotherwise. A painting of 15th century, for instance, is art not becauseit has some mimetic qualities, but only if satisfies the conditions ofour present concept. That it exhibits also intrinsic mimetic qualities,possibly highly esteemed in the 15th century, is a fact that we may as-certain, but it remains an irrelevant fact from a definitional and con-ceptual point of view (if not so, the mimetic property would be a ne-cessary or sufficient condition for «our concept» as well).As a consequence, the difference between the modern conceptof art, as Levinson understand it, and the older concepts is not only of
extensional nature. Nowadays, the mimetic concept too would be ex-tensionally different from what it was in 15th century, covering worksand objects that had not yet been produced at that time. However, themimetic concept (among others) and the post-1920 historical-intentional one are intensionally different, and individuate differentformal objects, so that we cannot even surely consider them as core-ferential unless we explain how to identify one and the same referentin an extra-conceptualway.
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Therefore, Levinson’s thesis «that currently the concept of art has nocontent beyond what art has been» so far (DA, p. 7) is ambiguous andrisks to be tautological, and it is not better to think that such a «con-crete» content could be purged of «any abstract principle or generali-zation» (ibid.), because, if so, the concept would turn out to be a sim-ple enumerative list, a fortuitous heap, even though it included bychance all the items someone, in any time, decided to call ‘art’. In real-ity, in order to retrospectively identify all and only the objects thatare correctly definable as art, «our present concept» has to overwriteall the earlier concepts.Thus, it seems that Levinson understand the historicality of theconcept of art in the sense (1), according to which the acknowledg-ment of art status to any object of the past depends on the mastery ofthe present concept itself. However, that is a problem, because ac-cording to the conceptual definition of art proposed by Levinson thecontent of the present concept of art depends on what art has been inthe past18, that is to say something whose historical difference, in thestrong sense (2), either we cannot establish, for epistemic limits, orwe have no need to ascertain, for conceptual irrelevance.
2. What does come before the definition?This problem rises another question: how do we come to grasp «our»modern concept of art? To what extent can we call it ‘our?? Levinsonseem to assume here that we should just observe a state of affair, butthe things are not so simple. In first place, it is not properly obviousthat the works of the so-called Avant-garde artists in the 20th centuryhave radically modify the concept of art to such an extent that thepast conceptions «no longer seem remotely adequate to the natureand range of what have been accounted artworks in the past hundredyears or so» (p. 27). But, ‘accounted’ by whom? And by what authori-ty?19 Nor can we take for granted that the «more radical activities of
18 In the words of the author: «whether something is art now depends, and ineliminably, onwhat has been art in the past» (p. 13).19 In the essay Hume’s Standard of Taste: The Real Problem, Levinson offers reasons for givingcredit to ‘ideal’ critics about the higher artistic value of certain works. It is impossible to dis-cuss here in detail this important paper, but for our present purpose at least two observa-tions are in order. 1) While for Levinson arthood in general is not defined in terms of intrin-sic value qualities, the superior arthood (the relative axiological value) is conceived in termsof the capacity to arouse qualitative aesthetic experiences (pp. 379-382), whom the ideal
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Conceptual artists […] seemed to establish that art per se had no needeven of any concrete object» (p. 29). In fact, these authors have estab-lished nothing cogent, at least unless we can make sure in a prelimi-nary way that their operations are actually pertaining to art history,that is unless we can establish that their works are actually art-works. Unfortunately, this is not a matter of fact, which we shouldjust record, nor is it an intuitive elementary evidence, something likewhat Boethius called propositiones per se notae. But then, how couldwe decide? Perhaps because we read so in some art-history text-books? Or because some museum curators think so? In this way, wewould end up subscribing to an institutional theory, that is a postula-tory theory, which in any case Levinson himself has rightly refuted.It is a formal fault to assert that the conceptual definition of artshould take account of the revolutionary outputs of the Avant-garde
art. To avoid the quaternio terminorum, first of all we should warranta pre-definitional or pre-theoretical identification. In fact, the epis-temic purpose of a rigorous definition is also to establish if certainobjects can or cannot be art, beyond controversial opinions. Theproblem is not new nor easy, from Plato’s Meno to Heidegger’s The
Origin of the Work of Art: to define X we have to know what counts asX, but without a definition we cannot correctly identify all the Xs.There is no room here to add more, but it is not clear what positionLevinson takes about this problem.Be that as it may, we cannot take for granted a common opinion,even if sustained by ‘experts’. First, because experts should exhibitand explain reasons, when requested, which are sharable by non-experts as well, and this is not surely the case. Second, a conception is
critics would go through better than others. However, Levinson doesn’t seem willing to inferthat the arthood of any artistic object could be defined according to a degree of that kind ofqualitative value. 2) As for the difficulty posed by Hume’s thesis – how can you identify anideal critic? – the answer of Levinson relies on a previous and independent identification ofsupreme masterworks, universally recognized, whom the ideal critics would be able to ap-preciate more fully than others, thus earning the title to authoritatively judge works of acomparable value but less universally undisputed. Nevertheless, Levinson doesn’t explain ifand how we can verify when someone has really appreciated a masterwork fully enough (ormore fully) to be considered an ideal critic, without mistakes or boasts about presumed abil-ities. Is it to be established by an ideal critic of ideal critics? And by reasons accessible tonon-ideal critics too, or through an even more rare sensibility? In any case, it seems difficultto say that the most radical works of contemporary Avant-garde are supreme or paradigmat-ic masterworks which passed the ‘test of time’, in the sense of Levinson.
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not necessarily correct only because is common. When we talk about‘our’ conception of art – to avoid what Floyd Allport called ‘illusion ofuniversality of opinions’ – we should not conflate a descriptive genet-ic-psychological level and a prescriptive one. Does the ‘current’ or‘ordinary’ concept of art explain how people actually tend to classifycertain objects or rather how people should classify them? It is by nomeans sure that, through an empirical test, ‘ordinary’ intuitions aboutthe classification of contemporary art would turn out to be so muchconvergent. Not to mention that, as psychologists know well, manypeople, including experts, not always conceptualize objects in a con-sequential or consistent way.Therefore, if we want to give normative force to the definition ofart we cannot settle for either an institutional solution or a doxastic-statistical sociological survey, for there is no one single conception ofart, now less than ever, which ‘emerges’ as self-evident. Unless, weshould add, one wants to believe in a kind of Zeitgeist, whose epochalsymptoms are to be divined and which guarantees the ‘right’ inter-pretation of the direction taken by History (of Art). But that amountsto believing in a «robust historicism of a Hegelian or Dantoesquesort», that is just the kind of historicism from which Levinson wishesto dissociate his own theory (p. 13).
3. Basic definitions and recursive definitionsThe problem of the ultimate foundation is a crucial one. Levinsonspecifies that his «basic definition of art» – meant to capture «ourpresent concept» – is not properly a recursive one, although «the full
extension of art in a given tradition might be displayed by a recursivedefinition» (p. 15). The distinction is appropriate, for a recursive –and not simply circular – definition needs a base clause that is inde-pendent of the recursive rule. But, then, what is exactly the differencebetween the recursive definition and the non-recursive definition(‘one-step’) which operate together in Levinson’s theory? The answeris not easy, because we have, on the one hand, the sociological survey,so to speak, of the use a given community makes of the term ‘art’(covering with it conceptual works and the like), use which, however,does not amount to a definition. On the other hand, we have the for-
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mal definition proposed by Levinson, which actually is a recursive de-finition20.In his earlier essays, Levinson tried to sidestep the charge of circular-ity suggesting that the intension of ‘art’ at the time t is to be «expli-cated» in terms of the extension of ‘art’ (and of ways it is or was cor-rectly regarded) prior to t, so that the concept is definable withoutpresupposing it (DA, p. 15; RA, p. 50). Nevertheless, it is not easy tosee how we could know the real extension of ‘art’, that is the range ofits proper application, without presupposing what is to be applied, allthe more because ‘art’, for the reasons examined above, cannot beother than «our present concept». Thus, it is even tautological that allthe objects included within the retrospective extension of the conceptshare ex hypothesi its intension, irrespective of their temporal or his-torical location. Only, in this way it is difficult to understand where isthe ‘irreducible historicality of the concept’.Clearly, however, Levinson cannot do without recursivity, for itallows to attain the maximum of formal abstractness for his theory,thus subsuming under one and the same concept also the most radi-cal trouvailles of the contemporary Avant-garde trends. But, as hefirst has pointed out, any recursive structure ends with a ne ultra,which is a critical point for a theory aiming to be purely relational,without any substantive-qualitative element. Hence the thorny collo-cation of the so-called ur-art, with which the whole process of inten-tional-retrospective reference ceases and from which all the art-forms of the tradition descend. ‘Thorny’, for it is precisely the finaland original element to fix the identity of the genealogic relation andto differentiate it from any other formally similar recursion, real orpossible. Just to take an example suggested by Levinson himself (RA,p. 49), you can identify the progeny of Charlemagne, and individuateits members, distinguishing it from other progenies, only if, soon orlater, you can substantially identify Charlemagne.Levinson’s most recent proposal to solve the problem, however,seems not completely in keeping with the anti-substantialism of hisbasic theory. He distinguishes between ur-art – «the ultimate non-artprogenitors of artworks in that tradition» (p. 18, italics mine) – and
20 In his last synthetic formulation: «something is art if it is or was intended or projected foroverall regard as some prior art is or was correctly regarded» (p. 13).
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first art, that is the first generation of works definable as art by virtueof the recursive definition. But the distinction is somewhat far-fetched, for the objects of both ur-art and first art are equally inten-tional artifacts and equally involve the same kind of regard (let us callit r): the only difference is that the r0 of the ur-art is not linked to anypredecessor, whereas this is obviously the case with the r1 of the firstart. Then, we have to deduce that the first artist is guided by the in-tention that his own work elicit an identical (or similar enough?) r asthe r of the ur-works, but not because these works exhibit intrinsicqualitative properties deserving a specific appreciation, for, if so, weshould include in the definition a condition of substantiality whichwould threaten the theory’s pretension of a purely ‘non-qualitative’definition. Therefore, the recursive reference of the first artist is de-fined and determined only by the retrospective form of the referenceitself, not by its content, so that, somehow paradoxically, the first art-ist either has no reason to refer to certain objects instead of others orhis own preferences are definitionally irrelevant. In fact, why shouldjust certain ur-works elicit such an interest unless for an intrinsicspecial quality which is positively attractive thus arousing a distinctkind of r? It is not easy to understand how the recursive processcould start in the first place, on purely formal conditions.Similar difficulties concern also the proposal of a disjunctive de-finition accounting for the peculiar position of proto-arts. Accordingto this definition «something is art iff either (a) it satisfies the basicdefinition or (b) it is an instance of first art – that is, one of thosethings from which all other art, that satisfying the basic definition,springs» (p. 18). But why should first art appear in the second dis-junct, since it regularly satisfies the conditions of (a), as it seems clearenough? One might think that the condition (b) holds rather for ur-art, but perhaps Levinson realized that this option would be in con-tradiction with the assumption that ur-arts are only «the ultimatenon-art progenitors» of the subsequent tradition. Anyway, the defini-tion of (b) puts forward a solution which Levinson himself shouldjudge «not acceptable» (ibid. n. 15), i.e. the retroactive attribution ofart status to first art, in the light of what has happened after its pro-duction: as if we said that first art is art only because a subsequent
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tradition recursively refers to (or ‘springs’ from) it, and this traditionis artistic because ultimately refers to that very first art21.
4. Form vs substance. How many concepts of art are there?The project of de-substantializing the concept of art rises some per-plexities also when we come to the issue of the trans-cultural andtrans-historical categorization, which is again both an epistemic andconceptual problem. Levinson discusses here the case of imaginaryalien civilizations, living before the human era, but it is clear that thesame may hold for more realistic cases. The key question is: how canwe classify an allegedly artistic production that is not historically andintentionally connected with the tradition we call ‘art’ (or we shouldcall so by normative definition)? An abrupt reply could simply be thatwithout such conditions the alien productions are not classifiable asart, whatever else they may be or have been. However, with great in-tellectual honesty, Levinson tries to give a more satisfactory andcomprehensive answer, which in turn, nevertheless, highlights fur-ther questions. Indeed, we should ask in the first place what leads usto presume to classify certain objects, even if alien, in relation to ourtradition, to such an extent that we have to «liberalize» it just for thispurpose (p. 20). There is no explicit answer, but perhaps it is possibleto guess why.Levinson allows that aliens could have had an autonomous tra-dition formally similar to our own, but acknowledges that this wouldbe not enough to individuate a sufficient connection between the twoindependent traditions. The only point of contact would thus consistin the possibility that the alien objects have been intentionally pro-duced for a kind of regard coinciding, if only per accidens, with the re-
21 Levinson denies that the notions of first art and ur-art «are elements in our concept of art»(p. 15) or in the «judgement that something is an artwork» (DA, p. 21). Again, it is not soclear what is meant here with ‘our concept’, but, in any case, the fact remains that the defini-tional concept of art, in its disjunctive formulation too, must necessarily cover also the in-stances of first art and ur-art, unless we want to break the recursive chain which identify thetradition. Even if the recursive extension did not include properly the ur-art and extendedonly to its descendants, its notion should be implied in the content of the concept at any rate,in the same way as the concept ‘descendant of Charlemagne’, even referring to all the des-cendants except for the progenitor, would be not definitionally intelligible if ‘Charlemagne’were not grasped in the intension of the concept itself. The concept ‘descendant of Charle-magne’ is not the same as the concept, say, ‘descendant of Charles the Bald’, although the setdenoted by the two concepts is partially coextensive.
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gard which is actually normative for our art history. By virtue of this‘extended’ theory, we may legitimately call the alien production‘*art*’, although the concept here is to be understood «in a stripped-down, form-and-function-based sense not equivalent to the sense weoperate with at present» (p. 21). In any case, the fact remains that«insofar as anything outside our art tradition is properly said to fallunder our concept of art, it is because we can appropriately relate itto our tradition of art» (ibid.), but then we should also acknowledgethat the relation between ‘*art*’ and ‘art’, since it is not a historical-intentional one, will necessarily be of conceptual order, and the coin-cidence – or, better, the identity – between *r* and r cannot be asimply formal-relational identity but must be a substantial-qualitative identity. Again, there is an unresolved tension betweenwhat can fall under «our concept of art» and the radical difference
postulated between this subsumption and «the sense we operate withat present». For Levinson, alien *art* could even be «some non-historicist predecessor of our current concept of art» (p. 20), thus,strange to say, it would be more closely similar to our concept ‘priorto the early twentieth century’ than the latter is to our concept post-1920.Then, can one really do without any qualitative notion? Surely itis not enough to appeal to ‘demonstrative’ or ‘paradigmatic’ refer-ences. It is not a viable solution to intentionally individuate the waysan artwork is or has been correctly regarded just pointing somethingout and saying «as those things are properly regarded» (p. 25). Butwhat ‘thing’, exactly? Within what boundaries? Even in the apparent-ly most simple cases, for instance the Mona Lisa of Leonardo, whensomeone says ‘that’, what should we mean by ‘that’? Does it includealso the frame, the material support, the title, the representationalcontent, the intentions of Leonardo, something else? «Those» arethings to be regarded in very different ways. As Aristotle says, onecannot prove essential nature «by pointing with the finger» (Post.Anal. 92a).In Levinson’s opinion, the maker of an artwork «need not pos-sess a substantive concept of what an artwork is», nor does he need atheory «à la Danto» (p. 34). However, the point is not that an artmak-er, qua artmaker, should posses such a concept (or, for that matter, amore formal-relational concept whatsoever), but, nevertheless, a
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substantive concept is necessary in order to identify art in concep-tually normative terms, no matter who makes the judgment, be it phi-losopher, artist, or layman. Indeed, conversely, if no one possessedsuch a concept the class ‘art’ could actually be empty and we couldnever know it. Levinson worries that such an admission wouldthreaten the art status of the most radical conceptual works, but, ex-cept for our deference to the institutional practices of museums andart market, there is no conceptual or phenomenological constraintpreventing us from saying, to paraphrase Hegel: ‘so much the worsefor the conceptual works’!The outstanding work of Levinson makes clear that our moderntradition tries to put together two different conceptions of art, onethat is largely trans-historical and trans-cultural, to such an extent tobe even compatible with imaginary alien creations, and the other onethat is viable, more or less ad hoc, only for contemporary Avant-gardetrends. Rather than supposing a radical historical transformation, inthe strong sense, of one and the same concept referring to very dif-ferent things – by no means an easy operation, as we have seen – it isperhaps more economic to think of radical different things that neednot be subsumed under one single concept, even if, by an irreduciblyhistorical accident, they share one single name.FILIPPO FOCOSI(University of Macerata)
ON THE IRREDUCIBLE AESTHETIC COMPONENT
IN LEVINSON’S THEORIES ON ARTWhile comprising a considerable number of essays spanning over aperiod of (more or less) ten years and concerning different philoso-phical topics, Jerrold Levinson’s Contemplating Art (hereafter, CA) re-veals a remarkable coherence, in employing a limited set of principlesin contexts as various as that of the definition of art, the nature of aes-thetic properties, the debate on musical expressivity, the interpreta-tive/critical activity of perceivers, and other more circumscribedmatters. The recurring, underlying ideas I’m thinking of include in-tentionalism (as regards both the definition and the interpretation ofartworks), the notion of musical persona, and realism about aesthetic
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properties. But there’s another idea that, despite being usually ig-nored by commentators, plays a no less relevant role in shaping Lev-inson’s aesthetic thought. I’m talking of the coalescence (i.e., fusion,interconnectedness, mutual appropriateness, and so on) of form andcontent (hereafter, I’ll refer to it as CFC). My aim then will be twofold:in the first place, I’ll point out and analyse the passages of CA wherethis paradigmatic aesthetic principle explicitly occurs; secondly, I’llshow how CFC, as is there articulated, can disclose interesting per-spectives on other aspects of Levinson’s theories about art and aes-thetic properties.The first reference to CFC is in Ch. 3 (Emotion in Response to
Art), where Levinson discusses some of the paradoxes that our emo-tional engagement with art raises. Facing the problem of the well-known paradox of negative emotion in art, Levinson ranks, amongthe best explanations of why people usually are not afraid of, andsometimes deliberately seek out, artworks (such as tragedies) thatarouse in them emotions such as shame, grief, sorrow, remorse, andso on, the so-called ‘organicist’ explanation, according to which nega-tive emotions elicited by artworks become a source of satisfactionwhen appreciated as «an essential element [...] appropriately raised»in the «formal, narrative and dramatic structure» of the work, and soas contributing to the total experience of the work as an organicwhole (CA, pp. 52-53). A second, even if more oblique, manifestationof CFC is in Ch. 7 (Nonexistent Artforms and the Case of Visual Music).The question Levinson faces here concerns the field of all possibleartforms, including nonexistent ones. What is noteworthy, from ourpoint of view, is, firstly, that he appeals to formal impulses – beingthey on the order of juxtaposition, fusion, or transformation of someexisting arts – to explain the emergence of new artforms; and, sec-ondly, that «new formal combinations» find their artistic raison d’êtrein making it possible to express what «weren’t possible before», or in«embodying moral social attitudes» and «advancing social claims thathadn’t been open to us» (CA, p. 119). What lies at the heart of the fail-ure of the (possible) art of visual music («an art of abstract colourfilm [...] comparable to music», CA, p. 120), is, indeed, its limitedstructural potentiality (e.g., there not being, in the chromatic spec-trum, something analogous to tonal relations of tension and release,consonance and dissonance, cadence and closure, and so on), which
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sensibly reduces its expressive and semantic resources (becauselacking the emotional qualities that such relations produce).The essay where CFC is most straightforwardly deployed is
Evaluating Music (Ch. 10), when Levinson, after having rejected theidentification of the artistic value of a work of music with the intrinsicvalue of the experience that the work, properly understood, offers,goes in search of some mid-level principles (i.e., principles which aremore general than features concerning the attractiveness of melodiesor rhythmic/harmonic inventiveness, but more particular than theappeal to the inherent rewardingness of musical experience itself)which could support the latter, this being, at any rate, the primarysource of goodness in music. And what these principles amount to is«a particular wedding» of «configurational/kinetic form» and «ex-pressive/interpretive content», the «fusion» of the «how it goes» ofmusic (the moment-to-moment evolution of its structure) with «whatit conveys» (in terms of suggestions of human gesture, feelings andagency) being more appreciable and satisfying than following musicand responding to music’s expressive aspect, when these are experi-enced separately (CA, pp. 198-200). But Levinson goes a step further,and states that, given that content itself admits of a «how it goes»component – i.e., the pattern of succession of the expressive epi-sodes/characters which a piece of music conveys – and so generatesan additional dimension of content (which he labels «dramatic»),such a relation between form and content can be realized at a «higherlevel», so getting very close to artistic value tout court, as the nameLevinson assigns to it («global significant form/immanent content»)signals, and as demonstrated in his convincing analysis of how theSchubert’s Piano Sonata in A major can achieve, through such a «tran-scendent unity», a «transfiguring» dimension with respect to the lis-tener (CA, pp. 200-207).Considerations of this kind are not restricted to musical field.Talking about the difference between erotic and pornographic pic-tures (Ch. 15), Levinson maintains that, while both are intended tostimulate sexually the viewer, the former also aim at satisfying an ar-tistic interest, inviting him/her to «contemplate the relationship» be-tween the «erotic content of the image» and the «vehicle» employedto achieve the stimulation, i.e., its formal (as well as expressive, dra-matic, social, and so on) aspects (CA, p. 263). Otherwise put, in erotic
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art the form/vehicle is, in some measure, opaque – whereas trans-parency of medium is a necessary condition of pornography –, andthis is why we relish paintings such as Ingres’s Turkish Bath or Cour-bet’s The Origin of the World, without going beyond the state ofstimulation that they inevitably generate (CA, pp. 268-270).The fourth part of the book (Chs. 16-18) is devoted to the topicof literary interpretation. Here, Levinson defends the view of hypo-thetical intentionalism, according to which «the core meaning of a lit-erary work is given by the best hypothesis, from the position of anappropriately informed, sympathetic, and discriminating reader, ofauthorial intent to convey such and such to an audience through thetext in question» (CA, p. 302). This leaves room for multiplicity of in-terpretations of a literary work – there being various, even if not in-definite, individually justifiable readings, which can eventually becombined in an integrated whole – and for the existence of a residueof non-paraphrasability, due to the «the inseparability of content andform» which is most evident in metaphor, whose «imagistic force»derives from the «specific feel of the words employed», form their«precise rhythms, resonances, and prosodic properties» (CA, pp. 296-297). And even in those cases, such as humorous artworks (Ch. 23),where inappropriateness, in the form of «incongruity» (that is, of«non-fittingness of items or elements one to another») plays a crucialrole in engendering amusement, still an aspect of congruity and fit-tingness has to be perceived: only grasping «the ‘why’ of the incon-gruity» and solving the puzzle it poses (though in a «relatively effort-less way»), we can get the «amusement of a higher order» that thebest humorous works are likely to offer, and that comes close to aes-thetic pleasure, as elsewhere defined by Levinson as the gratificationwe derive from our focusing on the relation between «what a workrepresents or expresses or suggests, and the means it uses to do so»(this relation being itself «kind of higher form»)22.The idea of an «intimacy between form and content in art» isnot, as Levinson admits, a novel one in the history of aesthetics; hetraces it back to Croce, Collingwood and Dewey (CA, p. 200n). We cansurely add to this list Kant (for his notion of adherent beauty) and
22 J. Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics (hereafter, POA), Ithaca, NY, Cornell UniversityPress, 1996, p. 10.
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Beardsley (for the coexistence, in the triadic criterion of aes-thetic/artistic value he offers, of formal properties such as unity andcomplexity along with content-oriented ones such as the intensity ofhuman regional qualities); it is possible to find instances of CFC alsoin the writings of contemporary analytical philosophers, such asDanto (who, in turn, refers to the use Hegel made of it), Budd and El-dridge. The ways Levinson works out this principle, while testifyingto its relevance in current aesthetical debates, also suggests further,interesting developments. Most notable is the fact that if we extendCFC, as articulated in Evaluating Music, to the other artforms, we areprompted to support the existence of an upper level of aesthetic su-pervenience, which would qualify the relation between beauty (assynonymous with excellence and other merit-terms) and the underly-ing aesthetic properties; the former being the product of the fusion ofan artwork’s expressive form and dramatic content, which can beequated respectively with formal and non-formal aesthetic properties(i.e., with the ordered interaction between expressive and semanticproperties, which in turn gain further intensity from their organic co-operation)23. This possibility was envisaged by Levinson in the sec-ond additional note to his paper of 1983 devoted to this topic – wherehe labelled the emergence-relation between aesthetic evaluationsand aesthetic properties (in addition to the standard one, that be-tween aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties) as «aesthetic value su-pervenience»24 – and later developed extensively by Nick Zangwill inhis pyramidal view of aesthetic properties25.Deployed as it is in various aspects of Levinson’s aestheticthought, CFC seems to find no place in his intentional-historical defi-nition of art except as the ultimate resource to which border-linecases – i.e., objects or events created outside the connective web ofconscious intentional backward references to integral sets of ac-knowledged ways of art-regards – can appeal to obtain the status ofarthood. Such are the cases of primitive art, non-western art tradi-tions, aesthetically pleasing industrial artifacts, and works springing
23 For a detailed analysis of this parallelism see my Due livelli di sopravvenienza estetica,«Aesthetica Preprint, Supplementa» 23 (2009), pp. 155-177.24 J. Levinson, Music, Art and Metaphysics (hereafter, MAM), Ithaca (NY), Cornell UniversityPress, 1990, pp. 157-8.25 See hisMetaphysics of Beauty, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001.
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from unconscious or self-contradictory intentions (such as Kafka’snovels The Trial and The Castle). To legitimate their art status, it canbe necessary, as Levinson admits, to take in consideration substan-tive, instead of purely relational, features on the order of «the amountof care evident in the handling of details, the degree of attention toform […] the sense of a statement being made, or an attitude ex-pressed» (POA, p. 170), the «exceptional potential [artistic] value»(MAM, p. 57), which, taken together, approximate to CFC. But herelies an asymmetry that, as I see it, can lead to paradoxical effects. In-deed, what if all the would-be artworks produced in recent timeswould pass the test for arthood (MAM, pp. 58-59) just meeting itsfirst and basic condition, that is, in virtue of revealing a purposiveorientation on the part of the maker through their «outward face»and «context of creation», including artist’s pronouncement andjournal’s reviews (MAM, p. 43)? We would be surrounded by a my-riad of artworks entering the realm of the ‘official’ world of art withthe help of no more than a well elaborated historical narrative, irres-pective of their actual power of arousing experiences as valuable asthat produced by some paradigmatic artworks to which they havebeen linked by some skillful critic; whereas our quest for qualitycould be satisfied (let alone past artworks) only with works of com-mercial/instrumental, remote (geographically and temporally), naïve,or ‘indie’ art. This is not an improbable scenario: look at what hap-pened in the field of visual arts, where genuine aesthetic value hasbeen constantly overwhelmed by socio-economical values imposedby the art system. I see no other way to invert this trend than to put,at the core of the definition of art, what plays, as I hope to haveshown here through Levinson’s insights, such an irreplaceable role inour understanding and appreciation of art: the aesthetic principle ofthe coalescence of form and content (CFC). I know Levinson would bereluctant to follow this path, given that he explicitly distances himselffrom a similar proposal, that forwarded by Richard Eldridge whostated that what is necessary and sufficient for a thing’s being classi-fied as an artwork is its possession of a «satisfying appropriateness toone another of a thing’s form and content»26. But this seems to me the
26 R. Eldridge, Form and Content: An Aesthetic Theory of Art, in Neill, Ridley (eds.), The Philos-
ophy of Art. Readings Ancient and Modern, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1995, p. 246.
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most promising account of the notion of art; one that sheds light onartistic practices, from both their productive and receptive side, andthat can be thought of as stemming from the same empirical groundthat directed Levinson towards his search for a definition of art,namely, the fact that there is «a deeper continuity in the developmentof art than is generally noted» (MAM, p. 18).LISA GIOMBINI(University of Roma Tre)
ON THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN THE DEFINITION OF ARTCast the first stone those who, being involved in the field of aestheticsand philosophy of art, have never felt sheepish when required to an-swer the naïve question (yet, alas, quite provocative): ‘what-is-exactly-the-purpose-of-your-work?’. Actually, it seems far from clearwhy anyone interested in art should worry about what aestheticiansand philosophers say in this regard. Most people are spontaneouslyattracted to art as a source of emotions and cultural satisfaction, butthis is not sufficient reason for them to be equally interested in the
philosophy of art. And in fact, people are usually not. So skepticismconcerning the significance of the whole enterprise of the philosophyof art should not surprise us. In most cases, though not always, itcoincides with a more general suspiciousness of the utility of philos-ophy tout court. The issue is, in a nutshell, why should commonpeople need philosophers’ opinions at all – especially in the field ofart where, in more than just one trivial sense, it is all a matter of tasteor, if you will, of educated taste.Jerrold Levinson’s Contemplating Art may supply embarrassedphilosophers with a good source of arguments to be brandished incase of need. The brilliant yet straightforward language of all 24 es-says in this book makes it accessible to a large audience, includingnon-expert readers, yet it won’t disappoint the connoisseurs in searchof philosophical thoroughness and insight. Levinson’ s expertise inphilosophy goes hand in hand with his passion for an acquaintancewith different art genres, from cinema to painting, from electro-acoustic music to classical symphonies, so as to make this collection a
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successful example of how well philosophical argumentation and aes-thetic sensitivity can sometimes coexist.One of the virtue of this collection is undoubtedly the thematiccohesion of its various sections which, in any case, explore a widerange of very different philosophical topics (music, pictures, history,Aesthetic Properties, among the others). This cohesion is guaranteedby the presence of Leitmotive in the dialectical advancement of Levin-son’s aesthetical reflection, developed (as in the best analytical tradi-tion) in the constant dialogue with his opponents and critics.
1. Aesthetic contextualism versus aesthetic isolationismIn this paper I shall discuss only one of the possible fils rouge that canbe discovered in Contemplating Art’s numerous essays; as a disclai-mer, I should explain that this implies only a partial reading of thebook, thus I drop any claim of thoroughness in advance.My idea is that the variety of themes in the book, together withthe remarkable profusion in examples always taken from actual art-works and art practices assumes an even greater significance if readin the light of an underlying principle which, at least in my view, playsa key role in the entire work of our author. I’m referring here to theimportance Levinson attributes to the function of context for a properunderstanding of art.What I will focus on therefore, is Levinson’s adhesion to what ithas been called aesthetic contextualism. As noted by Melvin Rader aslong ago as 1947, most philosophies of art, and mutatis mutandis,many contemporary aesthetic theories, can be classified in the oppos-ing factions of contextualim and isolationism: in this respect, Levin-son admittedly stands with the former.Aesthetic isolationism can be described as the idea according towhich the norms influencing the definition, the meaning and theevaluation of a work of art are not independent of the work as an artobject, but internal to it. The art object possesses determinate aes-thetic values in virtue of its having certain intrinsic qualities, inde-pendent of its socio-historical or cultural situation.Aesthetic contextualism on the other hand rejects the idea ofworks of art being completely self-determined objects whose valuedepends merely on some work-inherent qualities. Conversely, con-textualism claims that works of art are particular historically en-
28 J. Levinson, L. Giombini, F. Focosi, M. Di Monte, A. Bertinetto
trenched artifacts that can be completely understood only when con-textual background factors are taken into consideration. According tocontextualists, isolationism – both in its formalist and empiricist ver-sion – should be in discarded, since various features of the artistic,historical and social context in which the work was created and ap-preciated contribute to a large extent to the work’s identity.Roots of the isolationist approach may be traced back to Kant’sidea of the aesthetic judgment being necessarily characterized by akind of disinterested interest, achievable only by focusing on the per-ceptible, non-relational, features of the aesthetic object itself.Only if produced by the internal features of the object can aes-thetic pleasure be truly disinterested; thus, works of art are to be eva-luated for their formal attributes and their inner content alone, ratherthan by the external context of their provenance and creation. In thewake of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, a whole tradition of aesthetic iso-lationist approaches has developed, e.g. structuralism, empiricism,representationalism, against which contextualism fights.
2. The intentional-historical definition of artLevinson's intentional-historical definition, initially formulated in1979 and defended against various objections in Contemplating Art’sfirst two papers, builds the foundation for a definition of contextual-ism which may summed up in the slogan: ‘No work is an island’. Thekey idea is that no properties of an object can univocally determinethe concept of art, since this: «also depends on an historical relation-ship, that is, the relationship between the artist and his historicalpast, his practice and consolidated tradition»; thus, art-hood is not anintrinsic property of a thing: «but rather a matter of being related inthe right way to human activity and thought».Such a relation is inturn specified in terms of the intentions of an independent individual,the artist, where the intentions refer to the history of art. Levinson’sposition makes appeal to the intentionality of the author. The pur-pose of the definition is quite clear: Levinson’s work highlights theapparently commonsensical, yet too often undervalued, assumptionthat art is intrinsically related to its history. Thus, the context Levin-son is referring to is constituted strict sensu by the history of art andthe practice of art alone.
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A work of art is a thing intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art-regardin any of the ways works of art existing prior to it have been appro-priately regarded. We are accounting for what it is for an object to beart at a given time by reference to the body of past art: «The gist ofthe intentional-historical conception of art that I advocate is this:something is art if it is or was intended or projected for overall re-gard as some prior art is or was correctly regarded». The motives be-hind Levinson’s theory are conveyed in his rejection of both the isola-tionist (either empiricist or formalist) theories and the institutionaltheories: just as art cannot be defined by simply making appeal to itsintrinsic features, neither can it be considered solely as the product ofa series of social circumstances:The intentional-historical conception of art differs from the art-theoreticaland social-institutional ones, though, in positing as the crucial contextualcondition of art-hood not a relation to some prevailing artistic theory, nor arelation to a surrounding social institution, but a relation to the concrete his-tory of art-making and art-projection into which the candidate objects hopesto enter.Note, on the other hand, that Levinson’s remarking the irreducibleyet minimal historicality of the concept of art can serve to distinguishhis position from more drastically historicist perspectives such asthose of a Hegelian sort, whose possible relativistic consequences heclearly foresees.
3. Levinson’s contextualismLevinson’s form of contextualism thus maintains that works do notpossess explicit aesthetic properties, artistic meanings, or determi-nate ontological identity outside the general context of the art-historyto which the works belong. This has consequences for how we canhave a proper experience, and subsequently a correct understandingand evaluation of the work.Accordingly, it is the intentional-historicalcontext that makes artworks what they really are, but (and this, itseems, is the central point here) such context is not external to the artobject: the object intrinsically possesses certain relational properties.Therefore, if Levinson’s thesis is correct, the intentional-historicalfeatures alone constitute the necessary identity conditions of a workof art.
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It may be worth noting here that by formulating and defendinghis view against its main objections (accusations of recursivity, anth-ropocentricity, ethnocentrism) Levinson is accounting only for thedomain of works of art. One might be tempted, instead, to further ex-tend Levinson’s contextualist view to encompass the whole realm ofartifacts. Such a move, however, prompts exactly the criticism Levin-son addresses to the psychologist Paul Bloom, whose proposal is in-deed to apply intentional-historical definitions to artifacts of allkinds-chairs, umbrellas, and so on.  Bloom’s idea is that all artifactsare created with a precise kind of intention and it is by recognizingthis initial intention that we are able to understand them. Just as weneed to trace relations to episodes of the history of art and art’s tradi-tion to appreciate whether a particular object is art, the same can besaid with respect to ordinary artifacts. If we consider the concept of‘chair’, for instance, we may note that our understanding of it in-cludes entities that have been successfully created with the intentionthat they belong to the same category as current and previous chairs.But, Levinson remarks, such an assimilation is in fact misplaced.According to Levinson, the specificity of artworks should be pre-served against all reductionist attempts to align art products withcraft products: «Suppose that Bloom is right, and that an analysis ofthe sort that captures what is to be an artwork also captures what isto be an artifact of any sort. What if anything, would remain of the
special historicality of the concept of artworks, as opposed to those ofchair, pencil, house or other standard artifacts?» since, he concludesfew pages later, «what is special about the artifact concept artwork,one might say, is that it is a wholly relational one; it is more like thoseof observed thing or beloved object or prize winner than it is like thoseof standard artifacts, such as chair or cup or cabin, for which thereare at least minimal conditions of form […]».
4. Between essentialism and historical relativismNote that Levinson’s identifying works of art as wholly relational con-cepts it is not something that can go unnoticed, at least for anyonecommitted to the ontology of art. If works of art are intentionally de-pendent entities, how can they be at the same time real things withan ontological identity? It may seem that if the concept of artwork isintentionally-historically defined, then the ontological status of the
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work of art is not graspable before and independently of the use wemake of the relevant concepts and germane artistic practices. Levin-son maintains that nothing is an artwork in itself but only accordingto specific human intentions relating to an artistic tradition. To theextent that artworks are essentially historically embedded objects,that neither have definite status nor clear aesthetic properties apartfrom the generative contexts in which they arise, it follows that any-thing can be a work of art as long as it relates in the right way to thatnarrative dimension we call the ‘history of art’. Therefore, one mayconclude that there would be nothing to find out about works besideswhat our artistic practices in themselves determine.But then how can Levinson avoid the risk of falling back intoconventionalism’s pitfalls, that is, denying that art has essential con-nection to aesthetic properties, or to formal properties, or to expres-sive properties, or to any type of property taken by traditional defini-tions to be essential to art while being a ‘realist’? How can he holdthat kind of even weak objectivity he is referring to when writing:«the objectivity for aesthetic properties defended in this essay is notone that accords them a transcendent status, independent of humanreactions[…]»?Levinson’s philosophical path, I suggest, is characterized by aconstant attempt to avoid  several potential pitfalls that  threaten phi-losophies of art that are too chauvinist: essentialism, on the one hand,the idea that artworks have a predetermined nature, an ‘essence’,completely independent of social and historical factors; and historical
relativism, on the other hand,  the idea that artworks, like all othercultural objects, are the result of socio-historical forces and thereforedo not possess any autonomous reality. Of course the claim thatworks of art have a fixed nature just like other natural objects is toonaïve a metaphysical assumption to be taken seriously. If it is truethat works of art are not independent from the concepts we have ofthem and from our thoughts and practices, there is still no reason tothink that they do not possess a particular nature qua artworks. Thisis to say that a knowledge of art history is fundamental to a correctunderstanding of art. Nonetheless, we may still want to concede thatart history concerns entities with a specific ontological identity. Le-vinson’s idea is that it is not possible to decide whether something isa work of art just by considering its intrinsic features, as isolationists
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maintain, since works have an inescapable intentional-historical cha-racter. But the necessarily intentional character of works of art doesnot imply that they lack a specific nature. Works of art depend onto-logically on human intentions, since this is their way of existence quaworks of art. Yet this is not to say that they are nothing more thanpractices and concepts.What Levinson’s tries to teach us is that it is not necessary tochoose between essentialism and historical relativism, since they areeventually compatible and both indispensable to a correct under-standing of what works of art are.If contemplating art is to amount to understanding art, Levinson im-plies, then it must always involve, to some extent, contextualizing it.JERROLD LEVINSON(University of Maryland, College Park)
CONTEMPLATING CONTEMPLATING ART:
REPLY TO COMMENTATORSI wish first of all to thank my four commentators for having taken
Contemplating Art as seriously as they have and for trying to make amodicum of sense of it. That was not easy to do given that the book isa collection of essays, and a somewhat heterogeneous one at that.Two of my commentators solved this problem by narrowing their fo-cus to just one of the topics that loom large in Contemplating Art; inthe case of Alessandro Bertinetto, the topic of musical expression,and in the case of Michele Di Monte, the topic of the definition of art.My other two commentators solved the problem by looking the hete-rogeneity of Contemplating Art straight in the face and then uncover-ing some underlying principles or themes or leitmotifs in it; in thecase of Lisa Giombini, that of aesthetic contextualism, and in the caseof Filippo Focosi, that of the relationship of form and content.Let me begin my remarks with Focosi’s suggestion that the rela-tionship of form and content is a leitmotif of my aesthetic reflections.Focosi is certainly right to see that relationship as a pervasive featureof my thought about meaning and value in art. And he is also right tonote that I nonetheless decline, in my definition of art, to make the ex-istence or the character of that relationship a condition of arthood.
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On the one hand, as Focosi well knows, my intentional-historical de-finition of art is meant as an explication of the descriptive category ofart, or alternatively, of our current practice of classifying things as ei-ther art or non-art. And so that which is admittedly central to the val-ue of an artwork, or that on which its appreciation as art properly fo-cuses, is not thereby something properly included in a definition ofart whose aim is classificatory, is not thereby that which marks offartworks from other things, whether artifacts or natural objects. Onthe other hand, Focosi is right that I acknowledge the relevance ofsomething like the centrality of a concern with the form-content rela-tion in the case of certain borderline phenomena, such as aesthetical-ly compelling primitive artifacts or strikingly formed industrial ob-jects, which seem to call for inclusion as art even though not satisfy-ing the basic intentional-historical condition I posit as essential. But Ithink it is theoretically justified to confine that relevance to thoseborderline phenomena, rather than elevating it to a sine qua non forall artwork, given the increasing diversity and often pointedly anti-aesthetic impulse of art in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.Consider next how Focosi characterizes the principle to whichhe claims I give regular allegiance, and which he designates as the
coalescence of form and content, or CFC. Though there may be cases inwhich I would describe the relationship between form and content ina given work as a coalescence or fusion, I would not myself hold thatto be a formula of general application. That is to say, I do not thinkthat the form and the content of an artwork, even a successful art-work, necessarily coalesce or fuse, since that implies that the formand content are no longer separable or distinguishable, that the formand the content cannot to some extent be independently identified.But that implication is too strong. A principle of greater generalitythan CFC, and one to which I would more readily subscribe, would bethat of the interrelationship of form and content, or IFC, the idea beingthat the specific relationship of form and content in an artwork is theprimary locus of its value as art and the proper focus of artistic ap-preciation of it, whether that relationship in a given case and at a giv-en level amounts to complete interpenetration of form and content orto something short of that.I turn now to Giombini’s sympathetic reconstruction of some ofmy views about art, and can agree that the aesthetic contextualism
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she singles out for attention is even more of a leitmotif of my writingsthan the principle of the interrelation of form and content just dis-cussed.  (As she notes, I have even written an essay entitled Aesthetic
Contextualism, published in 2007, and which will be reprinted in aforthcoming collection of essays, Aesthetic Pursuits). What I was moststruck by in Giombini’s commentary was her bringing out the affinitybetween the principle of aesthetic contextualism and the intentional-historical definition of art which I have defended, with modificationsand qualifications, for thirty-five years now.In light of Giombini’s analysis one might well see the intention-al-historical definition of art as a special application of the principleof aesthetic contextualism broadly construed, along the lines of theslogan that Giombini recalls, ‘No work is an island’. Broadly con-strued, aesthetic contextualism about art holds that nothing of artis-tic significance about an artwork resides in its inherent form or per-ceptual appearance by themselves, but only in relation to the artisticcontext in which the work is embedded. The intentional-historical de-finition of art underlines the way in which the very status as art of anartwork depends on both its historical context in terms of past artand its intentional context in terms of the projections of a relevantagent, while aesthetic contextualism narrowly construed concernsthe way in which the artistic content of an artwork depends cruciallyon its contextual relationships to other artworks both past andpresent. Both theses, then, are instances of aesthetic contextualismbroadly construed, and though one might very well hold the secondwithout holding the first, they clearly make very good, and quite nat-ural, bedfellows. Finally, I can only applaud Giombini’s convincingdemonstration of the compatibility of a certain degree of both histor-ical relativity and ontological essentialism in the theory of art, andwould venture that these are perhaps even enjoined by a judiciousembrace of aesthetic contextualism.It is with pleasure that I now address Alessandro Bertinetto'scareful commentary on some of the musical essays in Contemplating
Art, since the aesthetics of music is the part of aesthetics closest to myheart, and begin by thanking him for drawing attention in a footnoteto a number of musical essays composed after Contemplating Art, allof which figure in a forthcoming collection, Musical Concerns. I am al-so gratified that he finds so much to agree with in the views I have
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put forward on musical expressiveness, musical performing, musicalnarrativity, and musical value.Especially worthwhile is the Bertinetto's précis of my account ofmusical expressiveness, which locates such expressiveness in the sus-ceptibility of much music to be heard, in virtue of its movement, asthe expression of an emotion or other state of mind, and which thusimplicates the hearing of an agent of such expression in the music,what I and others call a persona. I could hardly improve on that précismyself, and am glad to note Bertinetto's defense of the claim that ex-pressiveness, though distinct from expression, cannot be understoodwithout reference to it; the claim that an act of expression, whetherreal or imagined, logically requires an expressing agent, and that agesture similarly requires a gesturer; and the claim that a personatheory of expressiveness is in no way incompatible with recognitionof the culturally variable and grammatically governed aspect of theexpression of emotions. I would only signal that it is preferable tothink of the highly abstract and indeterminate agent of expressionheard in expressive music as an imaginary rather than a fictional enti-ty, since the notion of a fictional entity plausibly entails a framing in-tention or invitation to make-believe with a prop that, in contrast to anovel or film, is not normally present in connection with a piece of in-strumental music.Before leaving this topic I would draw attention to Bertinetto'sresourceful replies to the putative difficulty for a persona theory ofexpression posed by music that appears expressive of something im-personal, superhuman, or cosmic. He convincingly suggests that ei-ther the expressiveness in such cases is still anchored in a human re-sponse, only one that is directed toward the impersonal, superhu-man, or cosmic aspects of existence, or else that if the response is in-deed attributable to a nonhuman agent, such as destiny or fate, suchan agent must be to some extent personalized if we are to think of itas capable of expressing perspectives or states of mind.Finally, I can only concur with Bertinetto's briefer but equallyastute glosses on three other positions of mine staked out in other es-says in Contemplating Art.  The first concerns the impact that the per-ception or imagination of the performing gestures of musicians canhave on the musical gestures heard in the music performed, and thuson the perceived expressiveness of such music. The second concerns
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the way in which a persona theory of musical expressiveness, posit-ing the gestures of an imagined subject hearable in music's move-ment, rather naturally generates the possibility, albeit a limited one,of narrative and dramatic content in music. And the third concernsthe locating of music's main value in the quality of how it goes – howit unfolds over time, how it evolves from moment to moment – ratherthan in the quality of how it sounds. But Bertinetto plausibly proposesthat this claim might best be restricted to music whose thrust is pri-marily linear and teleological – the vast bulk of music from the 17thto the 20th centuries – since perhaps not applicable to certain con-temporary modes of music, such as ones of minimalist, spectral,trancelike, or freely improvisatory character, which arguably privi-lege the sonic surface of music over its sequential syntax.I have left for last the commentary of Michele di Monte, themost critical of my commentators – though his criticism is of the best,that is to say, constructive, sort. In addressing those criticisms I re-turn to the vexing yet unavoidable topic of art's definition. Di Monte'scritical reflections are among the most searching my theory of art haselicited since its initial formulation and offering thirty-five years ago,and they have the additional merit of taking into account all four ofthe major essays in which that theory is advanced. I do my best inresponding to them, though limitations of space and limitations in myunderstanding of some of his concerns keep my response from beingquite what those reflections deserve.I begin with Di Monte's pertinent questioning of the sense inwhich my account of arthood is a historical one. He quotes one of myformulations on this point, namely this: «whether something is artnow depends, and ineliminably, on what has been art in the past» (=A), but also glosses it, in his own words, like this: «the content of thepresent concept of art depends on what art has been in the past» (=B). However, these are not equivalent. B is about the content of the
concept of art, while A is about what is necessary for something to be
an artwork at a particular time. So if there is something problematicabout the definition's historicality understood as B, it is not some-thing that need worry me. The historicality of arthood on which I doinsist is captured by A, and is just the idea that having the status ofarthood at a given time depends on what has that status at an earlier
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time, rather than the idea that the content of the concept of art at agiven time is provided by what count as artworks prior to that time.Di Monte next raises the reasonable question of why in theoriz-ing about art we should assume that what is proposed as art by anywould-be artist of today actually is art, or alternatively, that anythinga consensus of influential art critics recognize as art today in factcounts as art? I'm not sure I have an answer to that question, but Isuppose I am willing to say, though I don't subscribe to a sociologicaltheory of arthood, that widespread acceptance of items as artworksby the art-interested or art-informed – a broadly social fact – is a be-drock datum to which a theory of arthood, of what is art and what isnot, must be adequate.   A third issue broached by Di Monte is theputative recursive character of my definition of art. Di  Monte claimsthat «the formal definition proposed by Levinson», according towhich «something is art iff it is or was intended or projected for over-all regard as some prior art is or was correctly regarded» (Contem-plating Art, p. 13), «[...] actually is a recursive definition». Now al-though I did propose a recursive definition of art in my 1979 essay27,that definition is not meant as an elucidation of our core concept ofart, but only as a highly idealized representation of the extension ofart, from first art to the present. As for my basic definition of art citedabove, and which is meant to capture the core notion of art withwhich we now operate, it is not, pace Di Monte, a recursive definitionas I understand that term. A strictly recursive definition of a domainposits a recursive structure for it that is expressed by an initial stepand a recursive step; but there is no trace of such a two-step struc-ture in the formal definition quoted by Di Monte from my 2002 essayon this topic28. Moreover, that basic ‘one-step’ definition, to which Iam committed, does not require identification of that which is actual-ly first art, does not even presuppose the intelligibility of the notionof first art, in order to get off the ground or be applicable in practice.Thus Di Monte is perfectly right to remark elsewhere in his commen-tary that I deny «that the notions of first art and ur-art are elementsin our concept of art».
27 J. Levinson, Defining Art Historically,  «British Journal of Aesthetics» 19 (1979), 3, pp. 232-250.28 J. Levinson, The Irreducible Historicality of the Concept of Art,  «British Journal of Aesthet-ics» 42 (2002).
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At the end of his commentary Di Monte suggests that my basicdefinition of arthood, in pointedly avoiding reliance on any substan-tive or normative notion of art, may render itself incapable of a justi-fied, rather than simply ad hoc, sorting of objects into art and non-art.Like Focosi, Di Monte is deeply suspicious of simply deferring to theartworld in its recognition of various modes of Conceptualist, Mini-malist, Appropriationist, and Exhibitionist activity as ones that issue,no questions asked, in artworks. One understands this suspicion, forno one likes to be scammed, conned, or hustled. But it should beborne in mind that acknowledging something to have arthood –which is just a certain sort of artifact status – is not thereby toattribute to it any value whatsoever – though it may, as I remarkelsewhere, involve recognizing it to be making a claim to possesssome sort of value or be worth engaging with.Still, Di Monte’s reflections lead one to think that perhaps weshould after all give up the attempt to articulate a unified concept ofart adequate to both traditional and avant-garde art, and instead con-tent ourselves, as Di Monte suggests, with recognizing two differentconcepts, one adequate to the former and one adequate to the latter.But I am, at this late point, still hopeful that the unity of the conceptcan be retained, and along roughly intentional-historical lines.
